



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330319**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

19 March 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000679DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

#### **1. (S) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Muhammad Tahar
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Yasir Ahmad Ali Tahar, Muhammad Ahmad Ali Tahir, Muhammad Ahmad Ali Tahir al-Ibbi al-Dini, Muhammad Taher, Hamad Taher, Farabi
- Place of Birth: Ibb, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1 January 1980
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000679DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in overall good health.

#### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 22 January 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al-Qaida member Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), after fleeing hostilities in Afghanistan (AF) with the purpose of returning to Afghanistan to conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces using improvised explosive devices (IED). Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training in July 2001 based on his recovered passport, and adopted a false education cover story citing travel only in September

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20330319

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2001 to hide his true intent and activities. Detainee probably fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with his brother and other members of the Martyrs Brigade with assistance of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT).<sup>1</sup> Detainee was arrested at the Issa Safe House controlled by GZ-10016. Detainee acknowledged associations with members and facilities associated with the Jamaat Tablighi (JT),<sup>2</sup> which are assessed to be linked to an al-Qaida facilitation network. It is assessed detainee will engage in extremist activities upon release. He has threatened JTF-GTMO personnel and continues to support jihad. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

**c. (S/NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Information was added in this assessment about detainee's threat against US personnel and his support for jihad. Due to this information, detainee's risk level was raised from **MEDIUM** to **HIGH**.
- Added aliases Farabi<sup>3</sup>, Muhammad Tahir al-Sulami<sup>4</sup>, Muhammed Hamed Allah, and Yassir Ali Abdullah Ali Ahmed Al Sulaymi.<sup>5</sup>
- Incorporated information about the activities at GZ-10016 and Issa Safe Houses

#### **4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:**

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<sup>1</sup> Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 1 targets include issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction.

<sup>2</sup> Analyst Note: Variants for Jama'at Tablighi are Talique Jammat and Markez al-Tablighi. The JT is an NIPF Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.

<sup>3</sup> ➤ IIR 6 034 0144 03, 000707 302 14-Sep-2002, Analyst Note: Listed as Muhammad Ahmad Ali, photo A020A. Initial research on this alias produced no results.

<sup>4</sup> ➤ GUAN-2007-B03750, Analyst Note: Listed with variant Muhammad Taher al-Sulamee

<sup>5</sup> ➤ Multiple ISNs Yemeni Delegation 26 MAR 2008.

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**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** While growing up in Yemen, detainee (a member of the Tahar Tribe) attended conventional school and had no structured religious education, although he identifies his father as a shaykh. During high school, detainee worked and lived in a grocery store in Aden, YM for three years, and prayed at the al-Huda Mosque. After graduating from high school in 1999, detainee taught elementary classes at the al-Hawarith School. Detainee did not receive military training, as his high grades in school allowed him to avoid being recruited into the Yemeni military.<sup>6</sup>

**(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee developed an interest in studying medicine in Pakistan. A JT missionary told detainee before he could do so, he would have to study the Koran. A representative from the JT mission went to the Pakistani Embassy and acquired a visa on detainee's behalf. In mid-September 2001, detainee flew from Sanaa, YM to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE), to Karachi, PK. A member of the JT met detainee at the Karachi airport and took detainee to the Makki Mosque. Detainee then traveled to Lahore, PK where he stayed for two days, and then continued to the Raiwind Mosque, where detainee met with a person named Ismael.<sup>7</sup> Detainee's brother also traveled to Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

**b. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee enrolled in the Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad in October 2001.<sup>9</sup> After Ramadan (17 November to 16 December 2001), a Pakistani named Issa took detainee to an off-campus house, known as the Issa House. Detainee went from the university to this house with fellow Yemenis Emad Abdalla Hassan, aka (Imad), ISN US9YM-000680DP (YM-680), Muhammad Muhammad Hassan, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM-000681DP (YM-681), Fayad Yahya Ahmed, aka (Fayad) US9YM-000683DP (YM-683), Muhammad Ahmad Salam, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM-000689DP (YM-689), and detainee's brother Ali Abdullah Ahmed aka (Ali), ISN US9YM-000693DP (YM-693, deceased). Issa told detainee to remain at the house at all times.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> IIR 6 034 0163 03, 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 GUAN 2007-T00651-HT

<sup>7</sup> 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: The Raiwind Mosque is assessed to be the Raiwind Center near Lahore, PK, where the headquarters for the JT is located. See 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.

<sup>8</sup> 000679 302 07-SEP-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee refused to provide any further information on his brother's travel to Pakistan and it is unclear if they traveled together. The brother noted is probably YM-693.

<sup>9</sup> 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 KB 22-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Variants for Jamia Salafia include Jamiyah Salfiyah, Jamea Salafeyah, Salafyah University, and Salafi University.

<sup>10</sup> 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 FM40 11-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: This reporting contradicts detainee's reporting in his KB (000679 KB 22-JUN-2002) where he claimed he studied at the university until February of 2002; while also stating in 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, that he spent several months at the Issa House before Pakistani Forces captured him. For reporting of detainee's and YM-693's relationship, see IIR 6 034 0043 03, 000511 SIR 13-Oct-2007, 000679 GUAN-2006-B03688-HT, and 000679 GUAN-2007-B04101. YM-693

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**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two safe houses in Faisalabad on 28 March 2002, arresting more than 30 suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested at least 15 suspected al-Qaida members, including detainee.<sup>11</sup> At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members and seized manuals, tools, and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators. The safe houses were operated by the LT and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF to help al-Qaida's Arab fighters escape Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup> Detainee and other suspects were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. All suspects were transferred to US custody in May 2002.<sup>13</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- Watch
- Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following item is reportedly detainee's:
  - Yemeni Passport, No. 00458056<sup>14</sup>

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 19 June 2002

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

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committed suicide at JTF-GTMO in June 2006 and detainee wrote family member in a manner depicting YM-693 as a martyr. Detainee, like YM-693, viewed the suicide as a continuance of their jihad against the US.

<sup>11</sup> IIR 6 034 0286 05, 000694 KB 22-JUN-2002, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: Issa's safe house was also called the Yemeni House and the Crescent Textile Mill house. The following were identified as those arrested on 28 March 2002 at the Issa House: ISNs US9YM-000679DP, US9YM-000680DP, US9YM-000681DP, US9YM-000683DP, US9WE-000684DP, US9YM-000686DP, US9SA-000687DP, US9YM-000688DP, US9YM-000689DP, US9YM-000690DP, US9YM-000691DP, US9YM-000692DP, US9YM-000693DP (deceased), US9LY-000695DP, US9RS-000702DP, and US9YM-000728DP. See IIR 6 034 0979 03, 000684 SIR 14-Oct-2004 and 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003.

<sup>12</sup> TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b

<sup>13</sup> IIR 6 034 0144 03, IIR 4 201 4063 05, IIR 6 034 0470 03, IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02, TD-314/20711-02

<sup>14</sup> 000679 PASSPORT PAK1-2002-805227 22-APR-2000

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- Recruitment of Yemeni males traveling to Pakistan to study at the Jamia Salafia University
- Curriculum of the Jamia Salafia University and its target audience
- The safe house in Faisalabad used to house foreign students attending Jamia Salafia University

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee's account is assessed to be almost entirely fabricated and he remains uncooperative. Detainee's story of traveling to Pakistan with the help of the JT is consistent with reporting from other JTF-GTMO detainees. While detainee probably did receive assistance from the JT, it was probably from members of the JT who were associated with the facilitation of recruit movements to the region. Detainee's passport indicates he entered Pakistan six weeks prior to his claimed date of travel. Detainee reported a false timeline to hide his travel to Afghanistan, his activities and associations with al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and his relationship with YM-693. Additionally, detainee's report concerning the time period he attended Jamia Salafia is inconsistent. Detainee is concealing travel to Afghanistan to attend militant training. Detainee's dates of travel are inconsistent between his own account and detainee's associated pocket litter. None of the other residents of the Issa Safe House have indicated detainee was anything other than a student.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a member of GZ-10016's Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training and adopted a false education cover story to hide the true purpose of his travels. Detainee probably fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with his brother and other members of the Martyrs Brigade with assistance of the LT. Detainee acknowledged associations with members and facilities associated with the JT, which are assessed to be linked to an al-Qaida facilitation network. His passport shows that he entered Pakistan two months earlier than he claimed. Detainee has continually voiced support for Islamic extremism since his detention.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a member of GZ-10016's Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training.
  - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee and many of the other detainees captured during the 28 March 2002 raids adopted a false cover story citing education as their purpose

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for travel to Pakistan. They additionally denied any links to al-Qaida or even travel to Afghanistan. These claims have been assessed to be false with reporting from other detainees confirming their travel to Afghanistan, training in al-Qaida camps, and participation in hostilities against US and Coalition forces.<sup>15</sup> Several detainees also had false student identification cards created to support their cover story.<sup>16</sup> (Analyst Note: Official documentation demonstrates detainee's claims are false. Detainee has claimed unsubstantiated timeline details and associates, and continues to withhold information. It is assessed he followed similar paths to those with whom he was captured. Detainee probably used an undiscovered alias in Afghanistan.) Detainee's current name is not assessed to be his true name and his true identity is not known. As detainee and YM-693 are brothers, based on Arabic naming structure, they should both have Ahmad as their second name. However, YM-693 identified Abdallah as his second name.<sup>17</sup>

○ (S//NF) Pakistani authorities captured detainee and about 30 other suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 during raids on LT operated Faisalabad safe houses identified as the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe House. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House. GZ-10016 stated he created the Martyrs Brigade, a unit conceived to conduct attacks against US-based targets employing remotely detonated explosives activated by Pakistan based triggermen using cell phones.<sup>18</sup>

▪ (S//NF) According to open source and other reporting, the residents of the Issa Safe House were part of a network poised to launch attacks against American installations and embassies in various countries. The plan had been finalized but was broken up by the Faisalabad safe house raids that led to the arrest of numerous suspects including its chief, GZ-10016, a key al-Qaida facilitator.<sup>19</sup>

▪ (S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISN US9SU-000707DP (SU-707), stated GZ-10016 was the director of the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad.<sup>20</sup>

▪ (S//NF) GZ-10016's original plan was to flee Afghanistan and travel via Pakistan to Iran, where he would set up a base of operations for the Brigade. GZ-10016's long-term intent was to train and place suicide bombers or remote-controlled explosive devices in efforts to attack US and Coalition targets in

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<sup>15</sup> >Analyst Note: As an example, ISN US9YM-000680DP claimed he was a student at the University and was identified as such along with detainee. See 000695 FM40 24-Sep-2004. However, YM-680 has also been identified as a facilitator and Usama Bin Laden adherent who swore bayat. See RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0117-07 ISN 493.

<sup>16</sup> Counterfeit PAK1-2002-805339, PAK1-2002-805338

<sup>17</sup> > GUAN-2003-T01406 and GUAN-2007-B03917; Analyst Note: Both detainees also wrote to the same people, although the addresses are slightly different and require further investigation.

<sup>18</sup> TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02

<sup>19</sup> SAP20020404000045 04-APR-2002, 000680 KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02

<sup>20</sup> 000707 302 11-SEP-2002

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Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> (Analyst Note: GZ-10016 established a training program at his safe house for the manufacture of remote controlled detonators and probably established the Issa Safe House for those with explosives experience and with the intent to send both groups back to Afghanistan for operations.)

- (S//NF) At least two individuals captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House had known explosives training. Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-Barasi, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), an admitted explosives trainer, reported detainee was a student at Faisalabad Salafist University.<sup>22</sup> Ravil Mingazov, ISN US9RS-000702DP (RS-702), received bomb training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp from mid-August through mid-September 2001.<sup>23</sup>

- (S//NF) GZ-10016 stated Sufyian Barhoumi, aka (Abu Ubaydah al-Jazairi), ISN US9AG-000694DP (AG-694), conducted training on remote-controlled detonators at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House for Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-Sharbi, ISN US9SA-000682DP (SA-682), and Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-Qahtani, ISN US9SA-000696DP (SA-696), in March 2002.<sup>24</sup>

- ♦ (S//NF) SA-696 confirmed the IED plan, stating that he intended to make circuit boards at the safe house to be used with explosives for operations against US forces in Afghanistan. SA-696 purchased enough components to produce 30 detonators and had produced two test units by the time of the raids.<sup>25</sup> Electronic schematics, electrical components, and a voltmeter were recovered in the raids.<sup>26</sup>

- ♦ (S//NF) GZ-10016 instructed Binyam Ahmad Muhammad, ISN US9ET-001458DP (ET-1458), and others to go to Pakistan for training in remote control detonators and subsequently to return to Afghanistan to train the Afghans. If they did not train the Afghans, then they were to build the devices and provide them to the Afghans.<sup>27</sup>

- (S//NF) GZ-10016 described his escape from Afghanistan with a group of other al-Qaida operatives under his command via Birmal and Zormat, AF and Bannu and Lahore, PK to Faisalabad with the assistance of the LT network of facilitators. According to GZ-10016, the safe houses, as well as transportation

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<sup>21</sup> >TD-314/33836-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/16969-02, TD-314/17373-02, TD-314/59808-05, For SU-707's reporting on Padilla, see 000707 MFR 17-JAN-2003, IIR 6 034 0657 02, IIR 6 034 0755 02, and IIR 6 034 0827 04

<sup>22</sup> IIR 6 034 0196 05, 000695 FM40 24-SEP-2003, 000691 FM40 16-SEP-2003

<sup>23</sup> IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0196 05, IIR 6 034 1483 03

<sup>24</sup> TD-314/17440-02, TD-314/17060-02, TD-314/17625-02, TD-314/18041-02, TD-314/35879-02, TD-314/39716-03

<sup>25</sup> TD-314/35879-02

<sup>26</sup> >TD-314/63481-03, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005(b)[1]

<sup>27</sup> IIR 6 034 0282 05, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-04, 001458 FM40 28-JUL-04

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and security for these moves was provided by LT operatives.<sup>28</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to be a member of the group of al-Qaida operatives who fled Afghanistan with GZ-10016.)

- ◆ (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu Yasir al-Jazairi), reported Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi, ISN US9YM-000688 (YM-688), was with a large group of Yemenis in Faisalabad, all of whom fled Afghanistan for Pakistan and were seeking to return to Yemen.<sup>29</sup> YM-688 was captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House.<sup>30</sup>
- ◆ (S//NF) GZ-10016 corroborated Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti's statements stating the Yemenis were moved out of Afghanistan and put into a safe house in Faisalabad to wait for new documents.<sup>31</sup>
- (S//NF) Analyst Note: It is assessed detainee traveled to Afghanistan in July 2001, two months after his brother YM-693. Detainee uses a common al-Qaida cover story linked to the JT to hide his assessed travels to Afghanistan where detainee probably received basic training, rejoined his brother, and fled with his brother to Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.
- (S//NF) Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story and al-Qaida is known to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.<sup>32</sup> Detainee stated a JT member obtained the Pakistani visa for detainee. After traveling to Karachi, detainee was met by a member of the JT who took him to the Makki Mosque and, after an unspecified period, detainee traveled to the JT world headquarters in Raiwind, PK.<sup>33</sup>
  - (S//NF) Analyst Note: While detainee claimed he received assistance from the JT, this assistance was either provided based on his expression to the JT that he intended to perform *dawa* (missionary work) for the JT, or more likely as part of an established al-Qaida facilitation network between Yemen and Pakistan. It is unlikely that dedicated JT members would obtain detainee's travel visa for him in Yemen except in the furtherance of *dawa* activities. It is equally unlikely that the JT would allow him to stay at the Makki Mosque in Karachi. The Makki Mosque is the central/main JT Mosque in Karachi and numerous detainees have used the Makki Mosque as part of a JT cover story for travel to Pakistan. Detainee has

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<sup>28</sup> >TD-314/16265-02, TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048, Multiple ISNs FBIS SAP20020330000051 30-MAR-2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b, 000114 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan-2001

<sup>29</sup> TD-314/44476-03

<sup>30</sup> 000679 FM40 11-SEP-2003

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/41623-02

<sup>32</sup> IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, JITF-CT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh

<sup>33</sup> 000679 302 19-JUN-2002, 000679 302 07-SEP-2002 Analyst Note: The Raiwind Mosque is assessed to be the Raiwind Center near Lahore, PK, where the headquarters for the JT is located. See 000681 302 20-JUN-2002.



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failed to validate his claims that he traveled for education and provided a false travel date in order to withhold disclosure of probable travel to Afghanistan.

Detainee's claimed travel for education is further discredited by his passport which contained a one month tourist visa (discussed below), not a student visa.<sup>34</sup>

- (S//NF) Contrary to detainee's claims of entering Pakistan in September 2001 to study, detainee's passport had a Pakistan entry stamp dated 30 July 2001. The passport also contained a one month tourist visa obtained 11 June 2001 which was valid for two months. The visa was obtained from the Pakistan Embassy in Sanaa.<sup>35</sup> (Analyst Note: Like detainee, his brother YM-693 presented the cover story he traveled to Pakistan to study at the Jamia Salafia University. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan two months after YM-693, whose passport has a Yemeni exit stamp dated 20 May 2001 and a Pakistani entry stamp dated 21 May 2001.<sup>36</sup>)

- ◆ (S//NF) GZ-10016 photo identified YM-693 as an individual he met in Kandahar in September 2001. GZ-10016 stated YM-693 was with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (Mukhtar), aka (KSM). GZ-10016 also stated he recognized detainee's photograph, but could provide no other details, although he did provide information on others captured at the Issa Safe House.<sup>37</sup>

- (S//NF) Detainee's name, Muhammad Tahir, appeared on a list that documented completed training, weapon expertise, and operational experience. The document noted Tahir completed basic training in August 1998, spent one month on the front beginning in July 2000, and requested training on tactics, artillery, and anti-aircraft systems.<sup>38</sup> (Analyst Note: Although detainee is assessed to have received militant training in Afghanistan, it is unlikely detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1998. On the document, Tahir noted his country as Pakistan and recorded that he attended the Khalid Bin al-Walid Training Camp. The al-Walid Camp is known to have accepted other trainees from Pakistan and Tahir is a name used in Pakistan as well. Detainee can not positively be identified as this Muhammad Tahir.)

- (S//NF) Detainee has threatened to engage in extremist behavior upon release, has threatened JTF-GTMO personnel, and continues to support jihad.

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<sup>34</sup> Analyst Note: For additional information on the JT and it's links to al-Qaida, see 28 Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, IIR 6 034 0278 04, IIR 6 034 0286 04 28, and Abu Bakr University Analysis (JDIMS, References). Other detainees associated with the Makki Mosque include US9YM-000028DP, US9BA-000052DP (transferred), US9SA-000114DP (transferred), US9YM-000152DP, US9MO-000294DP (transferred), US9SA-000333DP (transferred), US9SA-000507DP (transferred), US9JO-000651DP (transferred), US9YM-000683DP, US9YM-000686DP, and US9YM-000691DP – the last three were captured with detainee.

<sup>35</sup> 000679 PASSPORT PAK1-2002-805227 22-APR-2000, Analyst Note: The Visa was obtained in June and was valid through August but only allowed the holder to stay in Pakistan for one month during the period.

<sup>36</sup> 000693 Passport 29 Mar 2000

<sup>37</sup> TD 314 20711 02

<sup>38</sup> >AFGP-2002-901078, Analyst Note: Detainee is listed on page 43. The document listed detainee's country as Pakistan, possibly indicating detainee transit route into Afghanistan.

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- (S//NF) Detainee has stated he wants “the infidels [non-Muslims] destroyed because they are attacking God.”<sup>39</sup>
- (S//NF) During a debriefing, detainee prayed to God that the linguist be killed and threatened to instigate some sort of uprising in the camp, claiming the Americans are assaulting Islam.<sup>40</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee commented, “The world is watching the outcome of what is happening in Cuba.” Detainee stated he will clap when the United States falls. When asked how this would occur, detainee responded that the debriefer will see and then realize it when this occurs.<sup>41</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee threatened to kill members of the JTF-GTMO guard force.<sup>42</sup>
- (S//NF) In a letter to his family, detainee discusses the death of his brother, YM-693, in which detainee states YM-693 “went to Allah.”<sup>43</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee’s statement indicates he does not believe YM-693’s suicide was a sin, but instead believes YM-693 sacrificed himself for jihad against the US and his martyrdom granted him access to paradise.)

**c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 65 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 3 March 2008, when he failed to follow guards instructions when refusing to return from recreation yard. He has nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 1 December 2007, when he was reported throwing feces on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 27 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and three so far in 2008.

## **8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 1 February 2007.

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<sup>39</sup> IIR 6 034 0163 03

<sup>40</sup> 000679 FM40 24-SEP-2002

<sup>41</sup> 000679 SIR 23-JAN-2006

<sup>42</sup> >JDG INTREP dated 03-Dec-2007, 18-Nov-2007

<sup>43</sup> >000690 GUAN-2006-B03690-HT

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**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee was captured with a number of other Yemenis during raids on two safe houses belonging to GZ-10016. GZ-10016 was utilizing individuals in his safe house to receive explosives training and assemble IEDs in preparation for attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The JT recruited and facilitated detainee's travel to Pakistan, possibly in preparation for militant training in Afghanistan. While detainee and other safe house residents possibly fought and trained in Afghanistan, there is no additional reporting to validate whether or not detainee received training.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** If detainee entered Pakistan in mid September 2001, as detainee claims, and was captured in early March 2002, detainee probably has limited knowledge of al-Qaida, training and personnel. Detainee probably associated with Islamic extremist elements during his time in Pakistan, given his affiliation with the JT and the Jamia Salafia University. Detainee can possibly provide information on Taliban and al-Qaida fighters who were transiting from Afghanistan into Pakistan attempting to return to Yemen. Detainee would have knowledge of Islamic extremist recruitment practices and personnel operating guesthouses and safe houses. Detainee has made only one statement concerning his brother traveling to Pakistan. Further information is required to ascertain how detainee's brother was involved with Islamic extremist activities.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**


- Recruitment of Islamic extremists in Yemen
- Al-Qaida training, facilities, and activities against US and Coalition forces
- Safe houses in Pakistan
  - GZ-10016
  - Abu Zubaydah Safe House, activities and associates
  - Issa Safe House, activities and associates
  - Planned actions against US and Coalition forces
  - IED and explosives training
- The JT and the LT
  - Associates and leadership, funding, operations
  - JT mosque and religious studies facilitated
  - International travel
  - Al-Noor Mosque in Taiz, YM, and al-Huda Mosque in Aden
  - Courses of study
  - Support to al-Qaida
- The Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad
  - Curriculum, ideology, recruitment, safe house associations, and individuals
- Ingress and egress routes through Pakistan and Afghanistan
- Possible involvement of brother in extremist activities

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- Terrorist biographical and psychological information

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 7 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/k,  
  
MARK H. BUZBY  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.